On 21st May 2006 we celebrate the 48th anniversary of Shan Revolution day, although some people call it Shan Resistance Day. This is the day that the armed struggle for independence and peace in Shan State had its beginning. I believe it is worth while to look at why Saw Yanda took up arms against Rangoon and see if either side have learnt any lessons. 

History

In Sao Saeng Seuk’s history of the Shan's armed struggle for autonomy (ref 1), the former leader of the Shan State Army sets out the political backdrop of U Nu’s attempt to prevent the Shan Saophas from exercising their right under the constitution to secede from the Union with the threat of military action by the Burmese Army. During those days of nation building, Burma was in the chaotic process of political upheaval and insurgency across most of Burma. “Since that time Shan leaders have wrestled with the problem of central government abuse of power, Burmese chauvinism and the encroachment on the rights of other states.”

The Shan leaders continued their political activities seeking to adapt the un-finished constitution into a genuinely Federal Union that would give Shan State the autonomy that they and the people of Shan State desired. Shan students from Burma’s universities in Rangoon and Mandalay and Shan youth associations across Shan State had other ideas. They held political seminars and produced patriotic literature and magazines. However, they had little focus for action.

A charismatic young Shan from Yunnan, Saw Yanda, set up camp in the jungle near Mong Ton, between the Salween River and the Thai border. Saw Yanda announced the foundation of the ‘Noom Suk Harn’ ("Noom Serk Harn Terk-ao Lodliao Gawnkhaw" - Brave Young Warriors for Independence) on 21st May 1958, along with 30 Shan comrades (see footnote). 

The Noom Suk Harn had their own flag: an 8 pointed star above a crossed sword and spear. Saw Yanda claimed to have crates of weapons and machine guns, with backing of the US, and tanks and aeroplanes in secret locations in Thailand. Half believing these fanciful tales, several hundred patriotic young Tai joined Saw Yanda after the formation of his early independence army (ref 2). However, the group had none of arms promised, nor the backing of any super-power; 17 assorted carbines and what ammunition they could find, some of it left over from US air drops during World War 2. 

The band of rebels struck out and had several engagements with Burma army units. Their first big success was led by Chao Kyaw Tun and Bo Maung, when Tangyan in northern Shan State was captured from Burmese troops. Within a week the Burmese armed forces had retaken the town; the Burmese Air Force had strafed the Shan forces with bombs and the Shan troops retreated (Ref 3, 4). The die had been cast for Shan armed rebellion against Rangoon.

Big Politics

As a backdrop to this activity in Shan State, we should recall the overall situation around Shan States. Political disagreements within the main Burmese political parties had led to a split in the AFPFL; the CPB was operating with financial support and arms from Communist China; and eastern Shan State still had many KMT troops trying to retake mainland China on behalf of Chiang Kai Shek. 

U Nu and the AFPFL had been fighting amongst themselves for power. The AFPFL was in a dominant majority position within government and they sought to impose their brand of Marxism and build a monolithic socialist state. In reality, they vied for power and sought to create the totalitarian regime such as those in China or Russia, even though the Communist Party of Burma were one of their main armed opponents. Whilst these groups espoused the idealism of socialism, they and those that followed never delivered. Ne Win and his successors to the present day have tried to impose the one party central control model on Burma since independence, with little concern for the suffering and poverty they bring to the people. U Nu and the central Burmese government found the ethnic groups and their calls for autonomy and a Federal Union opposed their own hard line views. 

The CPB had been fighting the central government for many years and during the fifties was supported and funded by communist China. They sought to overthrow central government by force and had the weaponry and ammunition to sustain a long campaign. In the end, they brought their own end by internal squabbles, doctrinaire attitudes, mutinies and betrayal – by those who feared for own survival in the deadly purges. Obviously, the CPB had strong camps near the Chinese border, particularly in the north of Burma and northern Shan State.

The KMT had been defeated on Chinese soil and had fled across the border into Burma and Thailand, from where they sought to re-take mainland China. Bizarre as this may seem today; with upwards of 30,000 soldiers and funding from the CIA, support from the USA and Thailand, they were in a strong position regarding their own security and supply of arms and ammunition. As time went on, the KMT became the ex-KMT and turned to the Opium trade to fund their military activities. Their base for operations covered the southern Shan State and areas with good access to China. 

The Burmese army was fighting both the CPB and the KMT. The battleground was Shan State. When the Burmese army entered Shan State in the early 1950s, there was the feeling that this was a foreign invasion, as few Burmese soldiers spoke Shan, and they treated Shan States as enemy territory. All three groups sought to win over local Shan militia, some of which had been created by direct initiative of the Burmese government. However, their motives were not always altruistic; Shan troops were seen as ‘cannon fodder’ by the warring parties.

The rationale for the Noom Suk Harn was a patriotic armed group who would seek the removal of all foreign solders from Shan States; Burma army, CPB and KMT. These brave idealists wanted to bring peace to Shan States and stop the bloodshed of three warring armies marching over Shan States from one battle to another. Unfortunately for Noom Suk Harn, no government was interested in the fate of Shan State or the people of Shan State and so no money or arms were forthcoming. Noom Suk Harn relied on support from the ordinary people of Shan State. 

Lessons

Noom Suk Harn as with many early rebel groups was characterised by a number of factors that caused it to disappear; a charismatic but undemocratic leader, breakaway groups under individual commanders, change of allegiances – not for political reasons, but because the other group seemed to be winning – and lack of strong cohesive and resolute political leadership. 

Noom Suk Harn faced seemingly enormous obstacles, but faced up to them and started the spirit of armed struggle for an independent Shan State. They had their patriotic belief in the rightness of their cause to sustain them – Shan State. 

Armed rebellion has remained a fact of life for Shan State since the days of Noom Suk Harn and will do until the central government face the reality of their attempt at imposing an artificial and unworkable solution on Shan State, or on Burma. Armed rebellion will remain with Shan State until the central government listen to the Shan people – if they don’t listen, they will face insurgency. The present illegitimate government of Burma, the SPDC, is still trying to impose the totalitarian central government plan by military means that U Nu and the AFPFL wanted to impose by political persuasion.

The CPB are not the active band that they were in the 1950s. China has relinquished military conquest in favour of home grown adaptation to capitalism and economic conquest of weak countries like Burma. (Made weak by successive military governments). They don’t need to fund the CPB now; they are gaining increasing influence and monetary benefit from a ‘friendship’ with the SPDC. No doubt they will play this down in the run up to the 2008 Olympics, but they won’t miss the chance to exploit any commercial opportunities. It is unlikely that China would view an independent and astutely governed Shan State as such an easy target.

The KMT have been cleared out, having become something of an embarrassment. Their place in the illicit drugs trade has been taken over by the UWSA and other drug-traffickers in co-operation with local SPDC units. The drugs gangs are not interested in politics, borders or rights of any kind whatsoever; money and trade are all important. Shan State currently provides one of the best areas in South East Asia for Opium growing, heroin refineries and manufacture of methamphetamine. They will continue to fight to keep it that way. If they get pushed out by a military force, they will pack up and take their business elsewhere.

Noom Suk Harn represents the first ‘resistance’ by the people of Shan States to these political warlords and opium warlords using Shan State as a battleground. Subsequent Shan armies have drifted away from and towards this position over the years, but the problems remain the same; central government in Rangoon (or whatever it is called or wherever it is) lacking the political will to discuss either the Federal Union as agreed in the 1947 constitution, or the secession for which the people of Shan States have voiced their overwhelming support. 

Armed resistance will continue as long as any government tries to enslave and terrorise the people of Shan State in the way the SPDC are now doing. 

When the day comes that the people of Shan State have peace and self-determination, armed insurgency will stop. Until then……

Long Live Shan Resistance Day. Long Live Shan Revolution Day.

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Afterwords

In compiling this article, I had to dig around to find the information I have put here. There seems to be a number of objective scholarly works on the political situation and insurrection in Burma as a whole from a number of fine writers (Martin Smith, Bertil Linter, etc.), but few specifically on the Shan armies; those that exist are good explanations from the perspective of those personally involved – but this can be subjective and only cover a limited period of time. I think that there is a great deal of material for a historically complete and accurate work titled something like: ‘The history of the War of Independence for Shan State’. I leave it to our readers to put this right when the times come, and to end this work on a happy and successful note.

Armed rebellion can lead to bloodshed and suffering. And it isn’t just death from gun shot wounds; soldiers and civilians inevitably get caught up in war. Such war brings destruction to human habitat and the means of livelihood. Over the last 48 years and beyond, the brunt of suffering caused by these wars has been borne by the people of Shan States. I sincerely hope that one day soon, common sense and peace will prevail in Burma and the people of Shan State can re-build their lives and their nation, earning the respect and admiration of the world, most of whom don’t know who they are at the present time. 

References

Nation: Gums and Opium: Symbols of Shan Fight
The BurmaNet News: January 21, 1996 http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/reg.burma/archives/199601/msg00135.html

The White Umbrella.
Patricia Elliot. 1999. ISBN 974-202-046-9.
The Post Publishing Public Co. Ltd. (Post Books)., Thailand.
(Recently re-published in Thailand).

Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity.
Martin Smith. 1991, 1999. ISBN 1-85649-660-0
Zed Books Ltd., UK. / White Lotus Co. Ltd., Thailand.
The University Press Ltd., Bangladesh. / Room 400, USA

The Battle of Tangyan
Khuensai Jaiyen
http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/academic/political-science/freeburma/ba/1997/ba0197.html

Footnotes

Saw Yanda
Also known as ‘Chao’ Noi; founder of the first Shan resistance body, the Noom Suk Harn (21 May 1958, now celebrated as Shan Resistance Day). A native of the Yunnan Shan states who claims to be an illegitimate son of a prince. He first made a name for himself as a nationalist leader among the Shan of Kachin State (who comprised more than 60 per cent of the population) in the mid-1950s, and was at one time jailed for nationalist activities. Being a spellbinding orator and smooth-talker, Saw Yanda managed to convince the Shan in Thailand that he not only enjoyed the confidence of the Shan Princes (Saophas), but the support of the United States and others which enabled him to set up an army on the Thai border. He then styled himself a prince, ‘Chao’ Noi. When patriots from all over Shan State flocked to the border in reaction to Burmese heavy-handedness, Saw Yanda was incapable of capitalizing on the trust he initially enjoyed, resulting in student elements breaking away. In the mid-1960s, Saw Yanda even lost control of the Noom Suk Harn. His house in Chaingdao town (Thailand) was raided by a combined ex-KMT and former Noom Suk Harn force, but fortunately for him he was not at home. In 1968, Saw Yanda attempted a comeback with the help of General Li of the ex-KMT 3rd Army and Bo Moherng, then the SSA chief-of-staff. When SURA was formed, Moherng made Saw Yanda a vice-president, but he was soon pushed out. Saw Yanda now (1984) lives the life of a recluse in Chiangdao.

The Shan of Burma. 1987. ISBN 9971-988-62-3
Chao Tzang Yawnghwe
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.

Saw Yanda died on 21st Nov 1996 in Chiang Mai of a lung ailment, aged 69. Former Shan State Army leaders and Shans in northern Thailand attended his funeral at Wat Pa Pao.
http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/academic/political-science/freeburma/ba/1997/ba0197.html

For a list of the 31 comrades, see this article:
http://www.shanland.org/articles/general/2000/shans_take_up_arms_against_rango.htm

Acronyms

AFPFL - Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League
CPB - Communist Party of Burma
KMT - Kuomingtang (Chinese Nationalist Army)
SURA - Shan United Revolutionary Army
UWSA - United Wa State Army