The
following presentation is delivered by Harn Yawnghwe, Director of the
Brussels-based Euro-Burma Office and Advisor to the Ethnic
Nationalities Council (ENC) at the public seminar held at the Chamber
of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, 6 November.
It
was also attended by well known Burma activists such as Bo Kyi, Nang
Hseng Noung, Soe Aung, Dr Sein Win, Mark Farmaner, Moureen Aung-Thwin
and Debbie Stothard – Editor
BURMA - Perspective of the Ethnic Nationalities
Czech Parliament, Prague, Czech Republic - 06 November 2007
Harn Yawnghwe, Director, Euro-Burma Office, Brussels
Some
in the audience may be wondering why I have been asked to speak about
the perspective of the Ethnic Nationalities or ethnic minorities.
After
all, the recent popular uprisings in Burma have focused attention on
the fact that we have a brutal military dictatorship and that the
people want democracy. They may ask, ‘Why are we complicating matters
by bringing in the ethnic minorities?’
In one sense,
they are right. The uprising was not purely an affair of the majority
‘Burman’ people. Demonstrations took place in the Burman homeland and
in all the seven ethnic states. The monks that were brutally suppressed
were not all Burmans. Many were Arakan, Karen, Mon, Shan and even
Kachin. So it is clear that the democracy movement includes all the
people of various ethnic backgrounds.
But on the other hand, it
is very important that we talk about the ethnic nationalities. Why?
Because although each ethnic group may be a minority, when you take the
seven ethnic states together, their population make up 40% of
population of Burma (20 out of 50 million people), and their homelands
together make up 60 % of the territory of Burma (almost the size of
Germany). The problem of the ethnic nationalities, therefore, is not a
minority problem. It is a major constitutional problem.
Secondly,
the Burmese military first came to power in 1962 using the excuse that
it seized power to prevent the disintegration of the nation. At that
time, the ethnic states were trying to legally amend the constitution
to transform Burma into a federation. Therefore, if the military is to
give up power, we need to resolve this question.
Third,
while the ethnic people also want democracy as we have already seen,
they have been engaged in an armed struggle with the central government
since 1949. We need to understand what the ethnic nationalities want if
we want peace in Burma. However, it is important to note that the
ethnic conflict in Burma is not horizontal like in the Balkans. It is a
vertical conflict against the central government.
Given this
complicated situation, the United Nations General Assembly in 1994
adopted a resolution that called for a ‘Tripartite Dialogue’ to solve
the problem and build a sustainable democracy. This means a dialogue
among the military, democracy advocates, and the ethnic nationalities.
This
was the first time that the world body had recognized that the ethnic
nationalities’ struggle for their rights is as legitimate as the
struggle for democracy. It means that while the ethnic nationalities
are part of the democracy movement, they also have a unique and
different role to play in rebuilding Burma.
This is not
understood by many people. In the name of unity, they want the ethnic
nationalities to have exactly the same position as the rest of the
democracy movement. This is not unity but uniformity. The Burma Army’s
motto is ‘One blood, one voice, one command’. You cannot build unity
with such a slogan especially when 40% of your population is different.
Europe knows what it means to have unity in diversity.
So,
from the ethnic nationalities point of view, the UNGA resolution is
their window of opportunity. Fifty-eight years of armed conflict has
not brought about the desired results. It is, therefore, crucial in
their view that dialogue with the military is achieved.
But
the ethnic nationalities are well aware that a dialogue in itself will
not bring about change. Many ethnic armies entered into ceasefires with
the military starting from 1989 in order to find a political solution.
But the military has not kept its promises.
To bring about
the desired change, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the ethnic forces will
have to skilfully use the economic and social concerns of the people.
They will also need the full and coordinated support of the
international community.
In addition to sanctions, we need to
find a way to get Burma’s neighbours to commit themselves to help bring
about change in Burma.
Burma’s neighbours have awoken up to the
fact that the military’s mismanagement is causing instability in the
region. I believe we now have an opportunity to convince our neighbours
that if they want stability and economic development, things have to
change in Burma. If we cannot convince China, Russia and India to help
bring about change in using the language of democracy or human rights,
we might be able to convince them to support change now because of
economic factors.
There
is no better time than now. The world is focused on Burma. The UN
Secretary-General’ s Special Advisor Professor Ibrahim Gambari is fully
engaged. The UN Security Council has also endorsed his role. My
recommendations are as follows:
1. The international
community should fully support the efforts of Gambari. There should be
no parallel processes to the UN effort.
2. Gambar's efforts should be fully supported by the UN Security Council.
3.
However, the Security Council cannot be used as the sole instrument to
move the dialogue process. It will lose its effectiveness if it cannot
reach a consensus and it will backfire if China or Russia were to use
their veto again.
4.
We need a more permanent international effort to support Gambari. A
multi-party talk along the lines of the Six Party Talks for North Korea
but including the UN is needed. We need to get the neighbouring
countries committed to supporting Gambari and bringing about change in
Burma or they may be tempted to break rank in order to pursue
individual national interests at the expense of a rival.
5.
A 'Friends of Burma' or ‘Core Group’ to advise Gambari is not good
enough. It excludes the SPDC. Being extremely paranoid, they will see
it as a conspiracy against them. They need to be included and also held
accountable in an international forum. The process around Gambari needs
to be institutionalized.
6. In this context, an EU special
envoy could represent the EU in Multi-Party Talks. It would be better
still if the EU envoy had a troika team to assist him.
7.
It is crucial that the UN, SPDC, India, China and the US are in the
Multi-Party Talks. EU, ASEAN and Japan will be needed to provide the
balance. Russia might also be needed to ensure that it does not become
a spoiler.
In terms of the EU, opportunities to advance the
agenda will present themselves at the ASEAN Summit, the EU-India
Dialogue, and the EU-China Dialogue this month.
Thank you.
Question asked at the one-day Conference:
Q. If there is a ‘Tripartite Dialogue’, who will represent the ethnic nationalities?
A.
The concept of a ‘Tripartite dialogue’ does not necessary mean that
three parties or three persons have to be at the table. For example,
the SPDC is now talking to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi now as it did in
2000-2003. She is the key player. No one is asking for a third party to
be introduced now. We have to see dialogue as a process. We are just
trying to get a process started. The two parties have not even begun to
discuss substantive matters. The ‘Tripartite Dialogue’ concept means
that when substantive discussions start, we cannot solve the problem
just by talking about democracy versus military rule. The military came
to power because of its disagreement over a constitutional matter. The
talks will have to deal with constitutional matters. When this happens,
the process needs to be expanded to include all stakeholders,
especially the ethnic nationalities. In other words, the ethnic armed
groups have to be given an alternate way to settle their grievances – a
political solution instead of armed struggle.